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FOREWORD

To many in the United States, China looms large and
threatening. What are the national security and national
military goals of China’s leaders? What strategies are
Chinese leaders considering in pursuit of these goals? What
is the likelihood that these goals will be attained?
This monograph attempts to answer these questions
through an analysis of China’s defense establishment under
the leadership of Jiang Zemin. It assesses the political and
economic determinants of China’s effort to modernize its
armed forces. Four possible strategies are outlined: (1)
“playing the superpower game,” (2) “playing to its
strengths,” (3) “changing the rules of the game,”or (4) “don’t
play that game.” The factors that will determine the
selection of a strategy are examined. The most likely
strategy is identified and its outcome evaluated. Lastly, the
implications of the study for the U.S. defense community
are addressed.
Forthcoming studies by Dr. Andrew Scobell will assess
the substance and future of China’s “strategic partnership”
with Russia and analyze China’s use of force. A third
monograph will examine more broadly trends in the
Asia-Pacific region and their policy implications for the U.S.
defense community.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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CHINESE ARMY BUILDING
IN THE ERA OF JIANG ZEMIN

Mao Zedong enabled Chinese to stand tall;
Deng Xiaoping let the people get rich;
the third generation leadership, with Jiang Zemin
at its core,
will enable China to become a strong country.
-Zhang Wannian (1997)1

To many in the United States, China looms large as a
strategic threat. Some anticipate a threat emerging in the
foreseeable future, while others believe that one already
exists. Any rising power, as it seeks to find its place on the
global stage, poses challenges to the world community. So it
is merely prudent to consider the possibility that Beijing
might become an adversary. 2
One can point to either positive or negative trends to
support polar opposite judgments about China. It can be
argued that the country is evolving into a peaceable
responsible global citizen, or that China is a burgeoning,
belligerent power. There are positive signs that China is
becoming increasingly integrated into the world economy.
Beijing has a substantial material stake in preserving a
peaceful international environment and maintaining
cordial relations with Washington. On the negative side,
China, already a nuclear power with the world’s largest
number of men and women under arms, is actively engaged
in modernizing its nuclear and conventional systems. And
some of its leading strategic thinkers consider Washington
an adversary or potential adversary (see below). It is only
sensible to ask how China’s military capabilities are likely
to change during the early years of the 21st century.
The central challenge that China’s Communist Party
leaders face today is how to proceed with military
modernization in order to ensure a military strong enough
1

to be victorious in war without spending the regime into
oblivion. In other words, how does the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) avoid what might be dubbed the “Soviet trap”
of economic decline coupled with the emergence of a
politically unreliable army? The Soviet collapse was
systemic in origin but precipitated by the policies of Mikhail
Gorbachev. 3 From the Chinese perspective, the collapse was
due to excessive military spending. 4 The triggering event,
however, was the military’s abandonment of the communist
party’s paramount leader. 5 Beijing’s challenge is at the
heart of the “conflicting principles” in civil-military
relations: how to maintain armed forces sufficient to defend
successfully a regime from its enemies while at the same
time ensure that the military does not undermine the
regime by consuming too many resources. 6
While the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is 2.5
million strong and has made significant strides in
upgrading its forces, it remains quite backward with limited
capabilities. 7 At the dawn of the 21st century, Beijing very
much desires a stronger military able to project force swiftly
beyond its borders in order to defend its territorial claims in
the South China Sea and possessing greater conventional
and nuclear deterrence. 8 Moreover, Beijing wants to be
capable of projecting force within its current borders to deal
with ethnic rebellion in frontier regions and worker or
peasant unrest in China proper without outside
interference. The fear expressed by Chinese leaders about
the potential for the emergence of an “Asian” Serbia or
Kosovo is a strong indication of this. The level of alarm is
evident from the bald statement made by one PRC
researcher in a Hong Kong newspaper in late 1999: “Taiwan
is not Kosovo.” 9 Even before Kosovo, however, concern was
expressed that China’s efforts to deal with internal ethnic
unrest in the 21st century might be used as the pretext for
external intervention. Military operations against Tibet
separatists could, for example, prompt the imposition of a
“no fly zone” by an outside power. 10
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RICH COUNTRY, STRONG ARMY
However, China’s civilian leaders do not want defense
spending to serve as a brake on economic growth. The
political question of how Beijing can balance the need to
further modernize its military forces with the imperatives of
continued economic growth and Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) rule falls squarely in the realm of political economy.
How much (defense spending) is enough? The answer of
course depends on where China wants to go. What are
China’s national security objectives for the medium term
(next 10-15 years)? David Finkelstein has cogently argued
that these comprise sovereignty, modernity, and stability. 11
At a minimum, these translate into full control over the
geographical areas that the PRC currently occupies,
continued economic growth and prosperity, and the
survivability of the communist regime. At a maximum,
these mean full control of all territories claimed by Beijing,
and a wealthy, technologically advanced and economically
robust society with a powerful and state-of-the-art security
apparatus.
Chinese leaders and common people have long yearned
for a “rich country and strong army” ( fuguo qiangbing). This
aspiration has been articulated during both the 19th and
20th centuries. It is instructive to note that in the so-called
“Democracy Wall” movement of late 1978 and early 1979, a
recurring desire expressed by the people on the streets of
Beijing—at least as frequently as calls for greater freedom
and openness—was that China should become prosperous
and possess a powerful military. 12 A similar theme was
evident in the May 1999 popular protests against the U.S.
bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade. 13 The fourcharacter mantra was also very much a part of Deng
Xiaoping’s vocabulary. 14 More recently this call has been
repeated. 15
Chinese political and military leaders clearly have great
power ambitions. 16 Beijing is not satisfied with being a
regional power—it wants to be a world power. It is not
3

surprising then that the yardstick by which China’s leaders
measure their progress is the United States. And the prime
example of superpower failure—to be avoided at all
costs—is the Soviet Union.
This monograph analyzes China’s defense
establishment under the leadership of Jiang Zemin and
assesses the political and economic determinants of
Beijing’s effort to modernize its armed forces. First, four
possible army building strategies are outlined. Second, the
domestic and foreign factors that will determine the
selection of a strategy are examined. Finally, the most likely
outcome is presented and its implications analyzed.
ARMY BUILDING STRATEGIES
What are China’s national military objectives for the
new decade and beyond? David Finkelstein contends these
are to: (1) protect the CCP and safeguard stability; (2)
defend China’s sovereignty and defeat aggression; and (3)
modernize the military and build the nation. 17 In this
monograph I focus on the first element of the third
dimension: modernizing the military or what might be
called “army building.” As I see it, China can pursue one of
four different defense policy or army building strategies. It
can: (1) “play the superpower game”; (2) “play to its
strengths”; (3) “change the rules (of the game)”; or, (4) “don’t
play that game.” While these are analytically distinct
strategies, in practice, elements of one can very easily be
combined with elements of another in any number of
different variations.
Playing the Superpower Game.
The first alternative is to “play the superpower game.”
What I mean by this is that Beijing strives to attain all the
trappings of a late 20th century superpower. The prime
example of such a state is, of course, the United States. The
other obvious example was the Soviet Union. The strategic
accouterments of a Chinese superpower would include such
4

things as aircraft carriers, an active space program, and
sizeable nuclear arsenal with adequate delivery systems
(including fleet ballistic missile submarines [SSBNs] and
intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs]). According to a
recent RAND study, China is currently pursuing an
across-the-board modernization strategy. 18 This policy
option is what June Dreyer labels “fighting high technology
with high technology.” 19 In the 1990s China geared up to
develop a modern, high-technology air force. Military
leaders appear to believe that the sine qua non of a
turn-of-the-century regional power is a capable combat
ready air force. The PLA has set its sights on a long-term
plan to modernize completely its aircraft through a
combination of off-the-shelf purchases, technology
transfers, and pilot training programs mostly from the
Russian Republic. The primary lesson of the Gulf War in the
eyes of many PLA leaders is the primacy of airpower,
particularly the importance of controlling airspace or at
least denying it to a hostile power. 20
“Playing the Superpower Game” appeals to conventional
military thinking because it involves large concentrations of
troops, large formations of heavy armor, hundreds of high
performance fighter aircraft, not to mention battle ships
and aircraft carriers. This option also plays to public
consumption because it focuses on the acquisition and
development of weaponry and forces that can be readily
displayed in National Day parades and military exercises
that show well in news footage on national television. 21 The
depth of popular desire for higher global status for China is
evident in such things as the yearning for China to acquire
an aircraft carrier. 22 And the major impetus to China’s
space program is national prestige. There are, of course,
significant commercial applications for this program as well
as spin-offs for military technology. Formal planning for a
manned space flight began in 1992, and preparations
continue apace. China successfully tested an unmanned
spacecraft in November 1999, and expectations are high
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that China will succeed in putting a man in space early in
the 21st century. 23
Playing to Your Strengths.
The second strategy is what might be called selective
development of weapons systems and technologies that play
to China’s existing strengths and areas of greatest
potential. 24 China should avoid the temptation of seeking to
match its opponent’s strengths and instead build on its own
strengths. 25 As Admiral Liu Huaqing said in 1993:
The mission of our armed forces is to safeguard our inviolable
territory… and sea rights and interests. . . . Therefore, we
pursue . . . (a) military modernization (that) serves the needs of
territorial and offshore defense . . . in order to win a high-tech
local and limited war with the available weapons and
equipment.26

This option is what June Dreyer calls “doing more with
existing equipment.” 27
This army building strategy stresses that China should
pursue a defense policy which makes the most sense to
China for several reasons. Financially, it means that the
PLA does not need to fund modernization across the board
but can funnel money into “pockets of excellence.” Shortcuts
can accelerate the process: foreign technology can be
acquired by purchase or through espionage. The prime
target for the former is Russia, while the prime target for
the latter is the United States. That China has purchased
significant quantities of Russian arms in the 1990s is fact.
That China has targeted the United States as the prime
territory for obtaining military technology and actively
sought such intelligence through stealth purchases and
spying is also beyond dispute. According to a Chinese spy
manual published in 1991, intelligence gathering in the
United States is “necessary to make breakthroughs on key
technologies.” 28 What is in dispute is the degree of success
the Chinese have had. According to the Cox Report, China
6

obtained the plans to the W-88 warhead (better known as
the neutron bomb). China, while it has officially
acknowledged possessing the neutron bomb, has pointedly
denied achieving this technological breakthrough through
spying.29
In practical terms, the strategy of playing to one’s
strengths is simply a continuation of what is being done
now. Particular attention is being given to upgrading its
nuclear weapons program to exploit missile technology and
to deploy nuclear warheads not only strategically but also
tactically. 30 And, as one expert noted, the development of
nukes is “relatively cheap compared to efforts to achieve a
similar level of deterrence based on developing high-tech
conventional weapon systems.” 31
Changing the Rules.
The third army building strategy is to change some of the
fundamental rules and assumptions of conventional
(Western) thinking about defense and national security
policy. That is, rather than perceiving defense requirements
as separate and distinct from other national (civilian)
needs, Beijing would view them as integral and intertwined.
This, in essence, would mean infrastructure projects and
economic ventures should be evaluated not only from the
perspective of how they meet peacetime needs, but also how
they would contribute to wartime needs.
This ideal was present in Mao’s thinking on the
importance of the military contributing to nonmilitary
projects, and of the armed forces being an organic extension
of the people. Under Mao, Beijing sought to subvert the laws
of political economy as they relate to defense spending by
making the PLA a productive force and an educative force,
in addition to a fighting force. Soldiers could contribute to
their own upkeep by, for example, engaging in crop
cultivation and animal husbandry. Soldiers could also
assist in economic construction through participation in
public works projects. Politically Mao viewed the PLA as
7

ideological shock troops who could lead the masses by
example, serving as a “great school” for the entire country.
This concept of meshing military and civilian spheres is
also a logical extension of Deng Xiaoping’s thinking. Deng
rationalized placing a priority on economic modernization
over military modernization by emphasizing that the
former made important long-term contributions to the
latter.32 And under Deng, China sought to circumvent the
constraints placed on military modernization through two
creative initiatives.
First, the military was given a green light to utilize its
extensive economic holdings, expertise, and other resources
to raise extra-budgetary funds to supplement the modest
defense outlays it received from the state budget. 33 On the
one hand, Jiang Zemin’s initiative of the late 1990s to divest
the PLA of its business empire represents a reversal of this
thinking. On the other hand, this initiative appears to be
foundering.34 The second initiative was to diversify military
industries so that they could pursue civilian production. A
phrase widely used in China was “civil-military integration,
peacetime-wartime integration” ( junmin jiehe, pingzhan
jiehe).35 The idea was to facilitate technological transfers
from civilian to military use. Thus, the purpose was to
upgrade the technological level of military industries. The
term widely used in English, defense conversion, was really
a misnomer. 36 The recent stress on giving greater attention
to national projects that will serve peacetime and wartime
needs indicates a continuation of this line of thought. 37
Don’t Play That Game.
The goal of the fourth army building strategy is to avoid
having to play the superpower game altogether. That is,
Beijing does not need to get involved in a potentially
disastrous full-blown arms race such as that during the
Cold War. According to one source, the West sought to “lure
China into the trap of increasing military spending so that
the Chinese would step into the shoes of the former Soviet
8

Union.” 38 According to one strategic thinker, the outcome of
superpower competition between Washington and Moscow
was “one defeated, one wounded” ( yi bai, yi shang). As the
Soviet Union and the United States focused on military
competition, the thinker noted, West Germany and Japan
were able to concentrate on making themselves into global
economic powers. 39
This army building strategy is geared to waging
“asymmetric warfare.” 40 An oft-quoted phrase—attributed
to Mao—is very relevant here: “You fight your kind of war
and I’ll fight mine” (ni da ni de, wo da wo de).41 The
publication of such works as Unrestricted Warfare in 1999
by two PLA Air Force colonels points to the considerable
thought and discussion this policy has received in China.
The book has also received much attention in the United
States.42
In this alternative, the PLA essentially opts out of the
orthodox defense development model. China does not seek
to build thousands of state-of-the-art tanks, aircraft
carriers and attendant support ships, a massive nuclear
arsenal, and pursue a vast array of conventional weapon
systems. Instead of seeking to match up against the United
States head-to-head in battle space, China will focus on
developing capabilities that can indirectly negate these
apparent insurmountable strengths in technology and
numbers. These capabilities would include such things as
ballistic missiles, computer network attacks, and other
information operations, aimed at undermining the
economic, transportation, and communications infrastructures of a technologically superior power. Academy of
Military Sciences researchers discuss computer warriors
forming “network guerilla units” to hack into the Pentagon’s
computer systems. 43
A high priority is information warfare. 44 Indeed,
“information warfare” as conceived of by strategists in
China is not a means to attain battlefield dominance but a
key dimension of asymmetric warfare in its own right. 45
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China also attaches a high priority to “counterspace
operations.” Chinese analysts believe that the PLA should
focus on exploiting a weakness in U.S. intelligence,
communication, and navigation: excessive dependence on
satellites. There is considerable discussion among Chinese
strategists about antisatellite warfare. 46 This effort by
China to grasp the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is
not aimed at seeking to match the United States measure
for measure but rather asymmetrically with a regional
instead of a global focus. 47
Chinese thinkers urge attention to how concepts and
principles from “People’s War” can be adapted to fighting
modern warfare. In early 1998, for example, Chinese
Minister of National Defense Chi Haotian gave a lecture at
the PLA’s National Defense University titled “People’s War
Under Modern High Tech Conditions.” 48 And in the wake of
the Kosovo campaign, some PLA analysts have sought to
highlight the continued relevance of the principles of
People’s War in modern warfare. 49
Indeed, “Don’t Play That Game” is an application of
many of the principles of classical Chinese strategists such
as Sun Zi and concepts of Mao’s People’s War. Essentially
this army building strategy addresses the issue of how the
weak might overcome the strong. 50 It has been suggested
that the Chinese style of strategy may be better suited to
dealing with war in the information age than Western
styles.51
DETERMINING FACTORS
The factors likely to determine which army building
strategy China will pursue in the medium term are (1)
doctrine and warfighting scenarios; (2) domestic economic
and political variables; and, (3) elite perceptions of the
international environment.
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Doctrine and War Fighting Scenarios.
Current doctrine is known as “limited war under
high-tech conditions.” While a “strategic shift” from People’s
War to “Limited War” occurred in the mid-1980s, the
incorporation of a high-tech focus appeared in the 1990s as a
response to the Gulf War, reportedly at the prompting of
Jiang Zemin. 52 It is important to recognize that Chinese
strategic thinking is not monolithic, and there are
differences of opinion on military doctrine. According to
Michael Pillsbury, there are three very distinct and
different schools of thought within the PLA concerning the
type of future warfare China should be prepared to fight. He
identifies a “People’s War” school, a “Local (or Limited)
War” school, and an “RMA” school. 53 While Pillsbury views
these schools separate with no overlap, elements of People’s
War and RMA seem readily transferable to Limited War
doctrine. 54 Indeed, as noted above, Chinese strategic
thinkers do tend to take concepts from People’s War and
RMA and apply them to Limited War. And as Pillsbury
notes, limited (or “local”) war “seems to include a broad
range of scenarios, almost any war smaller in scale than a
global or major nuclear war.” 55
Many Chinese strategic thinkers believe that small or
medium-scale wars are likely and indeed inevitable in the
Asia-Pacific region. 56 While medium-scale wars in the
region may or may not involve China, certainly the PLA
must be ready. According to Dr. Cheng Guangzhong, a
research fellow at the Academy of Military Sciences, the
“probability of territorial disputes (in the Asia-Pacific)
sparking partial war and armed conflict is very high.”
Cheng’s October 1999 interview in a leading Chinese
newspaper paints a very sobering strategic appraisal of the
region.57
Even leaving aside this trend, the principle of active
defense central to Chinese doctrine increases the odds that
China will resort to force when faced with a crisis. The
ultimate form of “active defense” is a preemptive strike. 58
11

This, combined with Chinese attitudes toward the
importance of the first offensive strike in future war
replacing the traditional preference for a carefully prepared
and timed counterattack, significantly raises the potential
for China to launch a surprise offensive move. 59
Furthermore, the PLA’s primary warfighting scenarios
and training exercises involve Limited War. And the nexus
of the prime warfighting scenario, Limited War doctrine,
and National Security goals is Taiwan. Indeed, in the view
of many Chinese strategic thinkers, Taiwan is the dispute
most likely to drag China to the brink of war in the
foreseeable future. 60
Other scenarios for possible rapid military deployment
include the South China Sea, and China’s central Asian
border regions. 61 The central Asia scenario might involve
operations to counter domestic unrest in Tibet or Xinjiang
or border clashes with India. Beijing is particularly
concerned about stability in Tibet and Xinjiang, especially
the emerging insurgency and terrorism campaign being
waged by Uighurs. 62 To combat the Uighur challenge, “. . .
China is far more ready to employ military force within its
borders than without.” 63 This concern and fears of urban
unrest in China proper have prompted an increase in the
size of the paramilitary People’s Armed Police to more than
one million men. 64
Domestic Variables.
The PLA on the one hand is used to being revered and
privileged, while on the other hand having to place its
bureaucratic interests second behind the economic and
social needs of the country and the political demands of the
CCP. Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, the PLA was
expected to play political, economic, social, and internal
security roles in addition to being responsible for China’s
external defense. From the birth of the PLA in 1927 until
Mao’s death in 1976, Chinese military leaders were severely
constrained ideologically and technologically as to doctrine,
12

weaponry, and training. Then, during approximately 2
decades under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping (late 1970s
to mid-1990s), a more restrictive role was delineated, and
the military was encouraged to focus on defense
modernization. The constraints on the PLA during this
period were primarily resource-based as military upgrading
took a backseat to overall economic development.
In the era of Jiang Zemin, the defense challenge has
become more acute from Beijing’s perspective. This new
political era, which began in the mid-1990s when Deng
Xiaoping became too ill to function as paramount leader, 65
coincides with a period of flux in Beijing’s strategic outlook.
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet
Union (1991), and the conclusion of the Kosovo campaign
(1999), China now sees the global strategic environment in a
very different light. 66
Economic. Boom or bust, there are likely to be persistent
tensions between defense needs and sustaining economic
growth.Economic slowdowns, such as the one following the
1997-98 Asian financial crisis, will swell the ranks of the
unemployed. This in turn will increase the potential for
unrest. While official estimates of urban unemployment are
low, unofficial estimates are considerably higher—at least
as high as 8 or 9 percent, and perhaps as high as 25
percent. 67 China has appeared largely to avoid serious
fallout from the 1997-98 financial crisis, but its economy is
extremely vulnerable in several ways. 68 There are two
particularly serious weaknesses. The first is how to reform
inefficient state owned enterprises. Most are perennial loss
makers, and closing them down or even making them more
efficient would mean massive layoffs. The specter of worker
unrest is a frightening one for Chinese leaders and
employees as state owned enterprises constitute almost
three-quarters of all urban workers. 69 The second problem
is the “enormous buildup of nonperforming loans”—that is,
loans have gone unrepayed for longer than 3-6
months—and these comprise more than one-fifth of all
outstanding loans of China’s largest banks. 70 This raises the
13

possibility of bank and business failures and a stock market
crash. Such events could also trigger unrest when personal
savings and investments are wiped out. This scenario is not
so far fetched, judging by the October 1998 collapse of the
Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation. Foreign investors in this case, however, suffered the
overwhelming majority of the losses.
For more than 2 decades China has been able to sustain
high rates of economic growth. Even the lower growth rates
of approximately 7 percent have been sufficient to sustain
prosperity. Chinese officials seem confident of continued
growth of this order of magnitude for 2001. 71 As of early
2000, these leaders seem determined to proceed with
market-oriented reforms, especially initiatives aimed at
revamping China’s financial system and state owned
enterprises. 72
While unemployment continues to be a social problem
and of serious concern to Chinese leaders, the matter has
proved largely manageable. Although Chinese officials and
foreign observers have continued to express concern about
the destabilizing effects of a vast “floating population”
estimated to be as large as 100 million persons, this vast
pool of mobile labor, to the contrary, has had a positive
impact on social order and economic growth. The transients
provide a ready pool of labor in areas where there is
under-supply, thereby sustaining growth in economic
dynamic regions while at the same time moderating the
income inequalities of poorer regions that otherwise would
not benefit from the boom times in other regions. 73
Corruption is another intractable but so far manageable
problem. Corruption is endemic, corrosive, and of major
concern to Beijing. The question is what negative impact it
has. Corruption is arguably less destructive and destabilizing in China than in other countries. 74Indeed, in China’s
case it may actually stimulate economic growth. 75
Overall, China’s leaders can be cautiously optimistic
about the economic outlook. As of this writing, Beijing
14

seems on course to receive Permanent Normal Trading
Relations status from the U.S. Congress and is on track to
join the World Trade Organization.
Political. Many observers of Jiang Zemin era elite
politics point to the growing power and influence of the
PLA in foreign and domestic policymaking. 76 There are
differences of scholarly opinion as to the nature and
impact of this influence. Some argue it is largely limited
only to national security matters and that much of the
lobbying is strictly on an individual basis and is not
coordinated institutional or bureaucratic lobbying. 77 Others insist it is more extensive and more
institutional in nature. 78
I contend that senior military leaders in contemporary
China are very influential in national policymaking. Of
course they are more active in some areas than
others—particularly in those that fall within the
parameters of the national security objectives mentioned
earlier. PLA leaders, however, do not dictate policy or
control the agenda. Civil-military relations in the PRC are
perhaps best characterized as a process of continual
bargaining. 79
The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-96 was a watershed
in civil-military relations in China. 80 I argue that it was
the first crisis of the post-Deng Xiaoping era. 81It heralded
the emergence of a new configuration in military politics.
It was the last gasp of the dual-role elites prevalent in the
Mao era, and in the Deng era at the highest echelons.
China entered the Jiang era with civilian and military
leaders clearly differentiated. Jiang, unlike Mao or Deng,
has no significant military experience. While the episode
marked a significant change in civil-military relations
and highlighted the growing influence of the PLA, it also
probably marked the high water mark of military
influence. This is because the two key military figures in
the crisis, Long Marchers Liu Huaqing and Zhang Zhen,
have since retired. The words of subsequent military
15

spokesmen are unlikely to carry the same weight. 82
Nevertheless, the modes by which the PLA influences policy
have changed. Rather than make the concerns of the
military known only at the highest echelons of power
through informal discussions in smoke-filled rooms, in the
Jiang era the PLA also lobbies more publicly in the media,
through books, journals, and to political leaders through
letters and visits. 83 The National People’s Congress was also
a key forum for PLA lobbying in the 1990s. 84
Jiang Zemin has moved adroitly to establish his
authority in the PLA. As a consummate bureaucrat he
quickly grasped the importance of managing the military
nomenklatura—at the dawn of the 21st century, the top
ranks of the PLA are filled with men Jiang has appointed
and promoted. 85 Jiang moved to exercise the power of the
purse more slowly. The commercial ventures of the PLA
were allowed to go unchecked for almost 2 decades, and the
negative impact of this became more and more evident as
the 1990s progressed. Finally, Jiang acted, primarily
nudged by the rampant corruption that he believed was
depriving the party-state of much needed revenues. 86
Moreover, corruption in the armed forces was of even
greater concern because it is viewed as an “early symptom of
the erosion of combat readiness and party control.” 87 Also, in
banning the PLA from commerce, Jiang was making a
one-time commitment of state funds to compensate the
military for divestiture and increasing defense outlays in
the long term. 88 The divestiture has been stymied by fallout
from the May 1999 Belgrade embassy bombing though.
Consequently, it is unlikely that the PLA will be
dispossessed fully of its commercial holdings anytime
soon.89
Still, grasping the powers of appointment and the purse
do not a civilian controlled military make. There is still
weak institutional civilian control of the army in China. On
the CCP side, the tripod of party committees, the political
commissar system, and the political work committees do
ensure party control of the PLA for the moment. 90 However,
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if the past is any guide, political officers will tend to adopt
the military’s perspective instead of representing the
party’s interests. 91 Moreover, political indoctrination of the
military in the 1990s takes an instrumental form that
stresses blind loyalty to the party without articulating a
theoretical underpinning or rationale. 92 The major organ
through which actual party control is exercised is the
Central Military Commission (CMC) which, although
chaired by Jiang, is dominated by soldiers.
And the state apparatus for controlling the military is
very weakly institutionalized. While there is formally both a
party and a state CMC, they are one and the same—the
point is made clearly by the constant reference simply to the
Zhongyang Junwei and omitting the prefix “Party” or
“State” altogether. 93Furthermore, the Ministry of National
Defense serves purely ceremonial/diplomatic and
coordinating functions—it is a place to greet foreign
military delegations, etc. 94It is significant that in key pieces
of legislation such as the 1982 Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China and the National Defense Law of 1997,
there is no mention made of the Ministry of National
Defense or Minister of National Defense. 95
The current PLA leadership owes its political loyalty to
the abstract entity of the CCP and its personal allegiance to
Jiang Zemin who presently holds the troika of PRC
President, CCP General Secretary, and CMC Chairman.
While the personal dimension may be quite firm, 96 the
political link is less ironclad (see below). Still, a remarkable
and significant development is the establishment and
adherence to retirement norms established by the party. 97
There appears to be an unwritten pact that the PLA
supports the CCP, and in exchange the CCP gives the PLA
autonomy over military affairs and appropriate levels of
funding and guidance. 98Thus Jiang Zemin has stressed the
high-tech nature of warfighting and sought to provide the
PLA with sufficient resources to develop accordingly. Still,
there is a sense among soldiers that the CCP leadership has
incurred a substantial debt to the PLA during the reform
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period, and at some point the armed forces will call this in.
That is, as noted in the introduction, military modernization has taken a backseat to national economic
development. The impact of the organizational changes
announced in 1998 remains unclear. The creation of a “new”
civilian Committee on Science, Technology, and Industry
for National Defense (COSTIND) to replace the “old”
military CONSTIND and the formation of a General
Armament Department (GAD) could be a more coherent
and focused PLA research, development, and acquisition
effort. According to one analyst, the “most important people
and organizations” from the old CONSTIND shifted to the
GAD. And the “biggest organizational winners” in the
defense establishment reshuffle are the PLA and the
GAD.99 One analyst aptly characterizes party-military
relations in post-Deng China as a “bargaining” system in
which the PLA must be consulted on all major policy
issues.100
Increasingly, military sentiment appears to question the
heretofore sacrosanct party-army link. This takes the form
of advocating the statification or nationalization
(guojiahua) of the army. 101 The concern over the political
reliability of the PLA that was raised in dramatic fashion in
1989 continues to be evident from periodic condemnations
that appear in the official media of statification and
“depoliticization” of the armed forces. Despite the massive
political campaign launched in the aftermath of June 1989,
Beijing continues to be perturbed by the penetration of the
military by Taiwanese intelligence and the Falun Gong sect
in the late 1990s. 102
Elite Perceptions of the International
Environment.
While the environment in the Asia-Pacific region is now
peaceful, this is considered rather a superficial condition.
When a region has such dynamic economic growth, some
kind of military conflict is inevitable even if it is only minor,
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according to one scholar from the Academy of Military
Sciences. Therefore, according to the analyst: “. . . the
overall peace(ful) situation can be termed worrying and
moreover conflicts and crises are always occurring in east
Asia. . . .”103
In the 1990s China’s military leaders frequently have
been depicted as hardliners—the leading advocates of
tough, uncompromising policies toward the United States,
Taiwan, and territorial claims in the South China Sea. 104
PLA leaders are regularly depicted as belligerent or
bellicose. The most widely read work of the “China Threat”
school, The Coming Conflict with China, begins with a
highly incendiary quotation on page 1 by a senior Chinese
military strategist. Lieutenant General Mi Zhenyu is
quoted as saying:
[As for the United States] for a relatively long time it will be
absolutely necessary that we quietly nurse our sense of
vengeance. . . . We must conceal our abilities and bide our
time.105

This quote is, to put it mildly, very misleading. While it
appears that Lieutenant General Mi did indeed write this,
the quote is taken out of context for dramatic effect, with
misleading results. First of all, this is a most inflammatory
translation. “Quietly nurse our sense of vengeance”—a key
phrase—could also be translated “endure hardship in order
to wipe out our national humiliation” ( woxin cangdan).106
Second, the quote is portrayed inaccurately as evidence of a
bellicose PLA. In fact the second key phrase, “conceal our
abilities and bide our time” (taoguang yanghui), is taken
directly from the famous 28-character policy guideline
issued some years earlier by Deng Xiaoping. Third, the
original Chinese text does not explicitly mention the United
States.107
Chinese military men have also been quoted extensively,
threatening war against Taiwan and a nuclear strike
against the United States. These verbal barrages are to
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warn the U.S. armed forces not to meddle in Taiwan unless
they were prepared to risk a major conflict with China. 108
The saber rattling in the Taiwan Strait of late 1995 and
early 1996 was interpreted by some as reflecting a military
takeover of Taiwan policy. 109 The truth of the matter is far
more complex. Saber rattling was strongly favored by the
PLA, but it was the result of a consensus between Beijing’s
political and military leaders. 110 There is strong sentiment
for unification with Taiwan at an early date among both
soldiers and civilians. 111
While the anger and outrage expressed by Chinese
military leaders during the 1995-96 crisis reflected genuine
feelings of frustration, this does not mean the PLA was
itching to go to war over Taiwan. 112 In fact, the thinking of
Chinese soldiers appears to be quite close to the “military
mind” outlined by Samuel Huntington more than 40 years
ago.113That is, they appear conservative, pessimistic, and
wary of initiating hostilities. Indeed, in most cases, Chinese
soldiers appear no more eager and often less willing than
their civilian counterparts to resort to war. In short they
seem to react much like their U.S. counterparts. 114
The U.S. Threat to China: “It’s Taiwan, Stupid.”
Beijing sees the United States as its principle threat. 115
This is not to say that China sees war with the United States
as imminent, but rather Beijing has believed for the last
decade or so that Washington is working to undermine
communist rule and to stymie Chinese efforts to develop a
more powerful military. Since the mid-1990s, Beijing
concluded that Washington had reversed its “one China”
policy and was now actively working to prevent China from
unifying with Taiwan. In fact, Taiwan is now viewed as a
means by which the United States is actively preventing
China from being a “unified, powerful socialist country.” 116
According to a group of strategic thinkers led by Deputy
Director Zhu Chenghu of the Institute for Strategic Studies
of the National Defense University, “After the end of the
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Cold War, Taiwan has been increasingly used by the United
States as an extremely important chess piece to contain
China.” 1 1 7 Researcher Cheng Guangzhong from the
Academy of Military Sciences calls Taiwan an “ace [in the
game of] containing Mainland China.” 1 1 8 Moreover,
according to Cheng, there is a “. . . sharply increasing danger
of Taiwan independence [that] poses a serious threat to
China’s internal security.” 119
With the return of Hong Kong in 1997 and the
resumption of control over Macao in 1999, China has
unification with Taiwan high on its agenda. Beijing is
particularly sensitive to anything it perceives as moves to
sabotage efforts at making progress on unification whether
these are seen to come from the island itself or from
elsewhere. 120 As a result of this and the deepening
frustration over the lack of progress toward political
unification with Taiwan, China issued a White Paper in
February 2000 in an attempt to clarify its position. One of
the most important of the policy’s new features is a third
justification for the use of force. In addition to a declaration
of independence and military intervention by a foreign
power, China is now on record as also considering indefinite
refusal by Taiwan to engage in talks leading to unification
as grounds for Chinese military action. 121China is also
deeply suspicious of the man who was elected as Taiwan’s
president in March 2000. Chen Shui-bian has a long history
of advocating Taiwanese independence. While he has
publicly rejected pursuing independence, except as a last
resort if China attacks, doubts remain in Beijing about the
new Taipei leader’s real intentions. China, however, has
adopted a “wait and see” approach to give Chen some time to
reveal his hand. But Chinese leaders appear pessimistic
about prospects for progress on unification, and their
patience waiting for concessions from Taiwan’s new leader
is likely to wear thin before very long. 122
Chinese officials repeatedly insist that any military
action will be targeted at a minority of troublemakers who
are encouraged by “foreign forces.” 123 While China’s leaders
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were surprised by the forceful response of the United States
in sending two aircraft carriers to the vicinity of Taiwan
during the Strait Crisis, there is a firmly held belief in some
circles that the United States does not have the stomach for
a war with China over Taiwan. 124
China is concerned about the emergence of theater
missile defenses (TMDs) in the region, particularly the
proposal for a TMD for Taiwan. Such a move would not only
be viewed as serious intervention in China’s internal
affairs, but also as a hostile and aggressive act that would
almost certainly prompt military action. 125 The “stateto-state” concept floated by Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui
in mid-1999 and discussion of TMD for the island prompted
a barrage of hardline and bellicose rhetoric warning of the
prospect of hundreds of Chinese missiles raining down on
Taiwan and U.S. forces. 126 The new administration of
Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian, while adopting a
conciliatory and moderate tone toward China, has also
refused to capitulate completely to Beijing’s political
formula for unification. Taipei’s new defense minister
quickly indicated a desire to rapidly develop a missile
defense system for the island. 127
It is possible that at some future date China could feel
sufficiently threatened by the United States that it would
seek some kind of military alliance or alignment with
Russia. While China has tended traditionally to avoid
formal treaty commitments, over the long term this
possibility should be taken seriously. Should Beijing and
Moscow become increasingly disenchanted with the West
and find common cause on a number of issues, such as
missile defense, a strategic partnership of some kind may
coalesce. Certainly China and Russia have an active and
on-going trade in arms and a program of research
cooperation. Moscow has been particularly enthusiastic
about establishing some kind of alliance with Beijing and
Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin is on record
as an avid supporter of a Russia-China axis. 128 An alliance
would be all the more inviting if Beijing detected a serious
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effort by Tokyo to beef up its defense capabilities. China is
acutely sensitive to the specter of a militarized Japan.
Moreover, if the Korean Peninsula formed a single military
establishment either as a result of the two Korean states
confederating or the North being absorbed by the South,
China might feel further threatened. But the most
important triggering factor would be a serious deterioration
in Beijing’s relationship with Washington.
On the positive side, a welcome trend in Chinese foreign
policy is a new receptivity toward developing a multilateral
security mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region. This marks a
significant change in what had been an abiding Chinese
preference for bilateralism. 129 Furthermore, China’s
paramount interest is in maintaining economic growth
through the continued promotion of foreign trade and
investment. Beijing has a vested interest in maintaining
good relations with its neighbors. At present China holds a
significant trade surplus and continues to attract foreign
investment. Of course, if the terms of trade changed,
making China a net importer of goods and/or foreign
investors withdrew their funds, this could affect China’s
security calculus.
CONCLUSION
China is likely to adopt some combination of the four
different army building strategies set out above. However,
at least in the medium term it should fail to achieve its goals
of becoming a military world power. I now focus on the
former point before returning to the latter. Although, as
noted earlier, China has, in practice, already adopted a
patchwork of elements from all four army building
strategies, the inclination of China’s civilian and military
leaders will be for China formally to select one.
Army building strategies three and four are least likely
because neither offers the prestige and glory to the PLA in
the same way that aircraft carriers, armor, and high
performance fighters do. Strategy four (“Don’t Play That
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Game”) is highly touted by some Chinese military thinkers
and some analysts in the West but probably enjoys limited
appeal in the Chinese defense establishment as a whole. It
will also be difficult for civilian leaders to advocate this
strategy. Strategy three (“Changing the Rules”) can be
largely eliminated—but not completely—because of
inter-service rivalry. The various branches of the PLA will
likely be competing head-to-head more and more intensely
for limited resources. 130
The first and second army building strategies are more
likely. Doctrine and warfighting scenarios, and perceptions
of the international environment all tend to favor the
selection of strategy one (“Playing the Superpower Game”)
and, to an extent, strategy two (“Playing to Your
Strengths”). Domestic variables point the same way except
these suggest budget battles will likely lead to strategy one
being rejected and strategy two being adopted. Strategy two
is more astute budget-wise but probably not politically
viable. Strategy one is the most appealing to China’s
political and military leaders and to the masses, but too
ambitious to implement properly.
Ultimately, probably by default, strategy two will be
selected officially, but a combination of the four options will
actually be implemented. The powerful appeal of “Playing
the Superpower Game” is likely to win out among China’s
civilian and military leaders over the attraction of “Don’t
Play That Game.” For civilian leaders, the craving for
international respect and the desire for China to be seen as a
bona fide military power will probably win out. The
prestige, size of budget share, manpower, etc., are all factors
that make military leaders desire conventional military
armaments.
Despite the above forecast, there are still reasons for
China’s neighbors and the United States to be concerned. It
is likely that China’s defense establishment will strengthen
over time. However, rather than obsessively focus on the
emergence of a more powerful threatening dragon, other
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countries should give more attention to the strategic
implications of a weak China. Indeed, China today is not as
powerful or as significant a player as it is often made out to
be.131 And there is the possibility that China might become
weaker militarily and economically and perhaps evolve into
a looser federal system or in a more extreme case, even to
fragment. While the probability may be low, it cannot be
completely ruled out, and this eventuality must be seriously
considered as a future scenario. 132 The dangers of not
contemplating the unthinkable are evident when one
recalls that few analysts in the 1980s anticipated or even
entertained the possibility of a Soviet collapse.
Moreover, China’s prospects for democratization tend to
be rated as minimal. While the likelihood of China making
rapid strides toward democracy in the short term is
virtually nil, long-term trends are more promising. 133
Recent survey research reveals the presence of attitudes
receptive toward multiparty democracy among Chinese
entrepreneurs and local government officials. 134 Whether
China is making great strides or small steps toward
democracy, this does not necessarily mean that China will
become pacifistic. While a widely-held rule of thumb is that
democracies do not fight democracies, research suggests
that democratizing states tend to be bellicose. 135
In many ways it can be far easier to deal with a strong,
centralized great power than a sick or dismembered one.
When the Soviet Union existed, one knew that negotiating
with the regime meant dealing with Moscow. If an
agreement was worked out with some kind of verification
mechanism in place, one could be fairly sure that it would be
implemented. In the post-Soviet era, an agreement in
Moscow is more difficult to achieve, and one has less
confidence that it will be implemented. Even if the provinces
tow the line, 14 additional republics must be consulted.
Today in China, what goes in Beijing does not necessarily
hold true for Guangzhou or Shanghai.
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Although I argue that China will not succeed in
becoming a military world power during the next 10-15
years, this does not mean I believe that China poses no
threat to the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, the widely-held
conviction that the PLA poses a modest or nuisance threat
gives rise to a dangerous tendency to downplay or dismiss
the very real threat China’s military presents. 136 Despite
assurances that China will be too preoccupied with
domestic matters to have time to get involved in foreign
adventures, 137 it should be remembered that China’s
leaders seem particularly prone to perceiving foreign
threats if the country is beset by domestic upheaval—
especially if Beijing concludes that there is “collaboration”
between internal and external hostile forces as in the case of
the popular protests of spring 1989. 138 It is precisely at these
moments when Beijing is likely to lash out in order to
demonstrate to its enemies that China remains ever
vigilant and prepared.
However, rather than fear a highly capable PLA winning
stunning victories, the militaries of the Asia-Pacific region
should be more concerned about the prospect of spectacular
failure. The most plausible scenario is Taiwan. Failure on a
grand scale can come about either if China’s leaders
mistakenly believe the PLA can win in a specific scenario
and so proceed to launch an attack, or if Beijing believes it is
unlikely to win but has no choice but to go ahead and attack
anyway. Either way the results of a failed military strike
may be worse than victory, particularly in the case of action
in the Taiwan Strait. This is because where Taiwan is
involved, China is unlikely to admit defeat and desist. If the
PLA is vanquished on the battlefield China is likely to
persist in its quest. Beijing will seek to rebuild its military
might in order to ensure success next time. Thus defeat,
rather than clear the air, will probably prolong and
heighten tensions in the region. It may well spark a serious
arms race, as China’s neighbors perceive an increasingly
threatening security environment and respond.
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In sum, China’s national military and national security
strategies in the Jiang Zemin era merit careful scrutiny, not
merely in the context of the specific military capabilities
that the PLA is acquiring or seeking to acquire, but also in
terms of China’s aspirations. China’s expressed intentions
and goals, as reflected in the statements of top officials and
the writings of strategic thinkers, must be constantly
monitored.
Implications for the U.S. Defense Community.
The foregoing analysis holds three key implications for
the U.S. defense community. First, and most immediate, is
the question of missile defense for Taiwan. As noted above,
China is adamantly opposed to a TMD for Taiwan to the
point that some Beijing researchers have warned that
deployment would constitute grounds for China to initiate
hostilities against the island. The sensitivity of TMD to
China is important for the United States to recognize, and it
is foolhardy, indeed dangerous, not to take these Chinese
threats seriously. 139 Having said this, we must take every
opportunity to remind China about the destabilizing and
threatening effect of the recent missile buildup it has
undertaken in the Taiwan Strait. 140 China should recognize
that it is only natural with such a proximate and growing
threat that Taiwan would want to improve its missile
defenses. Moreover, if Beijing wants to prevent Taipei from
deploying TMD, it should ask itself what steps China could
take to eliminate or minimize Taiwan’s desire for such a
system. In the meantime, in the absence of any constructive
moves by China to decrease the missile threat, the United
States should assist Taiwan to develop the component
elements of a TMD that best suits the island’s security
needs.
Second, China is unlikely to become a peer competitor of
the United States at least not in the short to medium term.
This means that if the U.S. military were to confront the
PLA, it should be prepared to wage a limited asymmetric
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conflict in which the enemy will use surprise and deception
to exploit U.S. weak points. While a Major Theater War
cannot be ruled out, any confrontation with China is more
likely to require “small-scale contingencies” and the ability
to repel attacks on U.S. critical infrastructures. This
underscores the wisdom of following through on a stated
commitment to “full spectrum dominance.” 141
In a regional conflict between the Chinese and American
armed forces, it would likely be primarily a U.S. Navy and
the U.S. Air Force fight. However, if the war was prolonged
and/or escalated, it would also become an Army conflict. No
matter what the duration or scope of a U.S.-China war, the
Army would be involved in some shape or form. In the event
of the outbreak of war in the Taiwan Strait, the most
immediate impact on the Army would likely be pressure to
reinforce its forward presence in the region. Indeed, the
United States could expect its friends and allies in the
region to request immediate assistance in the form of U.S.
force buildups to provide added psychological reassurance.
The second impact on the Army would be a heightened state
of alert and readiness to deter an attack by another state or
nonstate actor seeking to take advantage of the diversion
provided by a U.S.-China conflict. Despite the June 2000
summit between the leaders of the two Koreas, tensions on
the peninsula remain. It is conceivable that North Korea
might launch an attack on the South if Pyongyang believed
that with a distraction in the Taiwan Strait, a surprise
attack would have a good chance of succeeding. A third
impact on the Army could be the order to deploy a force on
Taiwan either after the outbreak of war or following the
cessation of hostilities. While military leaders would
probably not favor such a move, under certain circumstances the National Command Authority might direct it.
This may simply be a small military assistance advisory
group to provide training for new weapons systems provided
to the Taiwanese military; or it may be a token combat force
deployed on the island after the hostilities have subsided to
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serve a tripwire function—one similar to that played by U.S.
forces along the 38th Parallel in Korea.
Third, military-to-military relations between the U.S.
armed forces and the PLA are extremely important and
must be rebuilt. The U.S. National Security Strategy’s
stress on engagement and the U.S. National Military
Strategy’s emphasis on shaping activities will never be more
critical than in the case of China. Initiatives by the U.S.
branch services should be substantive, noncontroversial,
and undertaken with a clear roadmap. Military-to-military
activities should not simply stem from the impulse to “do
something” but instead spring from a coordinated and
carefully crafted strategic plan that promotes our national
interests. For example, careful thought must be given to the
advisability of allowing Chinese military observers to watch
U.S. exercises. Any access should be conditional on balance
and reciprocity whereby U.S. personnel can engage in
similar activities. 142 Moreover, any roadmap must factor in
presence of “traffic cops” on both sides. 143 There are political
constraints in both countries that limit the feasibility of
certain activities, or completely rule out other types of
events. An example of the former would be the likely refusal
of China’s political leaders to permit PLA officers to
participate in a U.S. sponsored “role of the military in a
democracy” workshop. An example of the latter would be the
American military demonstrating cutting-edge U.S.
high-tech weaponry to PLA leaders. Avoidance of
controversial subjects will minimize the likelihood of
disruptions to the relationship due to partisan political
squabbles in either country.
While fully cognizant that we cannot expect dramatic,
short-term results, we can engage in a long-term effort on
matters of substance to further U.S. national interests. This
effort should consist of four types of activities, which one
could call the “pillars” of U.S.-China defense diplomacy: (1)
high-level visits, (2) functional exchanges, (3) routine
military confidence-building measures, and (4) integrating
China’s defense establishment into multilateral fora.
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High-level bilateral exchanges hold not merely symbolic
importance, but also help develop key personal relationships providing continuity for the larger relationship to
develop.
Functional exchanges provide the greatest potential for
substantive interaction and learning but can also be the
most controversial. These exchanges should not be limited
to educational field trips by U.S. National Defense
University students. Exchanges and conferences between
research institutes and military education institutions
could focus on nonsensitive matters. Possible themes to
pursue are joint studies of classic military campaigns in
history, professional military education in the two
countries, and the military’s role in peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations.
Routine military exchanges, such as port visits, are
valuable for establishing goodwill and as confidencebuilding measures. These kinds of interaction promote
important American values such as the principle of civilian
control of the military and increased transparency in
defense matters by the Chinese. At the very least, continued
contacts can improve understanding between the two
militaries and help decrease tensions. The significance of
these outcomes should not be underestimated. A greater
appreciation for the differences in areas such as national
culture and service cultures—easy to overlook but
extremely important—can minimize the chances of one side
misinterpreting the acts of the other side.
Integrating the PLA into multilateral defense fora is
also highly desirable. It permits the Chinese military to
realize the common challenges and aspirations they share
with their colleagues in other countries. This kind of
interaction helps PLA leaders gain a better sense of the
characteristics of a modern military beyond crack troops
and possession of high-tech weaponry. Furthermore, PLA
leaders may come to value the formal and informal
dialogues with their counterparts in other countries and
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find the interaction useful and professionally rewarding.
The United States is well-equipped to build this pillar with
well-developed multilateral mechanisms already in place in
the Pacific. The PLA should be encouraged to attend
regularly the annual Pacific Armies Management Seminar
(PAMS) typically hosted jointly by the U.S. Army and the
land service of another Pacific Rim country. China’s
attendance has been somewhat erratic to date. In addition,
it would be hoped that the PLA would send a representative
to the recently created Pacific Armies Chiefs Conference.
The inaugural session was held in Singapore in 1999 in
conjunction with PAMS. Moreover, Chinese defense
professionals should be frequent attendees at seminars
hosted by the Pacific Command’s Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies in Honolulu. 144
Careful attention to the issue of TMD for Taiwan,
persistence in maintaining capabilities across the full
spectrum of military operations, and reconstructed
military-to-military relations with China will enable the
U.S. military to be truly “persuasive in peace, decisive in
war, and preeminent in any form of conflict,” as envisioned
by Joint Vision 2020.
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